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Abstract

One of the first steps in intergroup conflict resolution is to humanize the "enemy" or outgroup. Unfortunately, this humanization often fails. My goal in this paper is to answer the
following question: Why does positive information about a group sometimes lead to negative
responses? Specifically, this paper tests three hypotheses. First, I hypothesize that Individuals
with high ingroup-centric beliefs will react differently to the treatments compared to individuals with low ingroup-centric beliefs. Second, I hypothesize that individuals who experience
dissonance as a result of the treatments will react negatively to the treatments. Finally, I
hypothesize that the framing of these images has an effect on the magnitude of respondent’s
negative responses. The study finds that certain types of treatments work better for either low
or high ICB groups. It is possible to increase empathy and humanization in both high and low
ICB individuals.

1

Introduction

“‘What tribe do you belong to?’ Was the question I asked a woman in Kigali, Rwanda during
the late summer of 1994. Her answer was simple and yet profound. ‘What does it matter?
I am a Human Being.’ Human Beings are hard to kill, hard to hate, hard to eliminate, but
‘Invenzi’ are Tutsi cockroaches and needed to be stepped on and crushed. After all what did it
matter whether they were eliminated from the earth?”
– Jon Blanc, “Rwanda – 10 years after the Genocide”
This Rwandan woman understood what scholars have now verified; dehumanizing an enemy is often one of the first steps towards discrimination (Short, 1996),
genocide (Staub, 1989, 1996), and even war (Bjerstedt and Others, 1991). The Nazis
are a prime example, stripping Jews of their names and instead referring to them by
the numbers tattooed on their forearms. As Blanc highlights above, the Hutus referred
to Tutsis as cockroaches during the Rwandan genocide. Both of these situations point
to the fact that if you want to make one group hate another, you first have to make
them seem less than human.
If dehumanizing the enemy is a step towards conflict, humanization of the enemy
is often one of the steps toward conflict resolution. Sometimes this tactic works (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006), but sometimes it doesn’t. Recently, scholars have attempted
to understand the circumstances under which humanization fails, for who it fails, and
why (Gubler, 2013, N.d.).
In this paper I attempt to expand on this research by answering three questions.
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First, is it possible to produce negative responses (in this case cognitive dissonance)
in individuals by presenting them with positive images of an out-group? Second, do
individuals with high ingroup-centric beliefs (hereafter ICBs) react differently to these
stimuli compared to individuals with low ICBs? Finally, does the framing of these images have any effect on how respondents react to the treatment? By addressing these
questions I hope to begin to develop profiles that will allow the scholarly community to develop more effective humanizing treatments. Specifically, I use the logic of
"microtargeting" to understand how different types of treatments may be effective for
different subpopulations.
The treatments used in the study did not create sufficient levels of dissonance
to test some parts of the theory, but the results show important differences between
groups that will help scholars in the future develop more effective conflict resolution
techniques. Additionally, the data provides evidence for the "microtargeting" theory;
that different groups may be better served by different types of treatments.

2

Background and Theory

As mentioned above, humanizing the enemy is often seen as one of the first steps towards conflict resolution. Those involved in conflict resolution have sometimes been
perplexed to find that when they present certain members of the in-group with positive messages about the outgroup, they exhibit negative reactions. I would suggest
that one of the main problems is that until recently these messages have been created with a "one size fits all" philosophy. I would also suggest that by shifting from
this cookie-cutter philosophy to one based on the theory of microtargeting, we can
improve the effectiveness of humanizing treatments.
Microtargeting is the idea that by using cluster analysis, it is possible to predict
certain behaviors of individuals based on other information about that individual.
Microtargeting has been used for quite some time in marketing, but within the last 10
years has seen a surge in popularity in the field of politics. The idea has mostly been
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used by political candidates to aid in finding individuals who can be persuaded to
change sides and improve contact with voters who are likely to vote for them (Hillgus
and Monson, 2008; Hillygus and Shields, 2014; Campbell, 2007, chap 6). Recently,
microtargeting has also been used to attempt to find campaign donors (Hassell and
Monson, 2013).
In the same way that microtargeting can be applied to market research and political campaigns, I believe microtargeting can help us understand why some individuals react negatively to positive information about the outgroup. In fact, some have
already shown that individuals sometimes react negatively when shown mistargeted
messages. For example, Hersh and Schaffner (2013) show that voters penalize candidates when they see messages targeted for a group that they are not a part of. I argue
that a similar phenomenon occurs in conflict resolution. Different types of treatments
should be more effective for different types of group members. In this paper, I attempt
to make the first steps towards understanding how humanizing messages affect these
different types of group members. Specifically, I examine how levels of empathy, ingroup centric beliefs, and cognitive dissonance affect how an individual perceives
humanizing messages. To understand how these factors might affect an individual’s
reception of humanizing messages, I briefly explain each of them.
The goal of humanizing an out-group is to make an individual feel empathy towards them. Abundant research has shown that producing empathy towards an outgroup can lead to positive attitudinal change (Batson et al., 1997, 2002; Batson and
Ahmad, 2009; Galinsky and Moskowitz, 2000). Unfortunately, some scholars suggest
that there are certain types of people who will not respond positively to attempts to
create empathy (Gubler, 2013, N.d.; Glasford, Pratto, and Dovidio, 2008; Glasford, Dovidio, and Pratto, 2009). These scholars have slightly different theories, but they all
essentially find that if an individual experiences cognitive dissonance, they are less
likely to make an attitudinal change.
Cognitive dissonance is a psychological phenomenon first conceptualized almost
sixty years ago by Festinger Festinger (1957). Since then, many scholars have stud-
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ied dissonance and its effects (Aronson, 1969; Elliot and Devine, 1994; Cooper, 2007).
Most scholars define dissonance as a negative feeling occurring when an individual
realizes their thoughts, words, or actions are different from what they ideally expect
from themselves. For example, if I think of myself as level-headed and patient, I will
likely experience cognitive dissonance when I lose my temper and yell at someone.
Other scholars believe an individual must feel compelled to act on this feeling and
change their behaviors before experiencing dissonance (Harmon-Jones, Amodio, and
Harmon-Jones, 2009). Because dissonance is psychologically uncomfortable, those
who experience it will attempt to reduce it somehow (Harmon-Jones, 2000; HarmonJones, Peterson, and Vaughn, 2003). Gubler suggests that there are only two ways
to reduce dissonance; either the individual can change the way they act, or they can
justify the actions that produced the dissonance Gubler (2013).
To understand how an individual might justify a biased action, consider two competing sports fandoms. For example, I love NHL hockey, especially the San Jose
Sharks. The Sharks’ rival team is the Los Angeles Kings, and when they play each
other the fans on both sides get extremely heated. When a penalty is called on the
Sharks, the Sharks fans moan and howl about how unfair the call is. Kings fans, however, always seem to think the call is perfectly deserved. I often find myself unwilling
to believe that Sharks players are capable of unsportsmanlike conduct, even when I
see a flagrant foul. I think things like "it must have been an accident", or "he was just
defending his teammate" before admitting that one of "my" players has done something wrong. Similarly, an individual might justify a dissonance-causing behavior by
creating any number of excuses for their actions. I argue that which of the above two
methods an individual chooses to reduce dissonance depends on two factors; whether
or not an individual feels empathy for the out-group and the individual’s level of ingroup centric beliefs.
In-group centric beliefs, a measure developed by Josh Gubler Gubler (2013), combines three separate measures developed previously; Outgroup Denigration, Ingroup
Glorification, and Ingroup Victimhood Orientation. Gubler’s research suggests that

5

Context Matters

James Martherus

this measure is the best way to determine which individuals have negative opinions
about the outgroup Gubler (2013). Assuming the measure is accurately measuring
negative feelings towards the outgroup, we should see that those who have low levels
of ingroup centric beliefs do not experience dissonance when exposed to humanizing
treatments. Conversely, at least some individuals with high in-group centric beliefs
should feel dissonance when exposed to these treatments because they will feel compelled to change their beliefs and actions towards the outgroup. Gubler’s studies
confirm this; humanizing treatments successfully create empathy for those who already have positive attitudes about the outgroup, but among those with negative attitudes about the outgroup, only a subset had increased empathy levels post-treatment
(Gubler, 2013).
Because this research is very new, there are still many questions to be answered.
Can we create empathy without dissonance? Can we create empathy in spite of dissonance? To answer these questions will require extensive research, but using the
theoretical framework described above, I propose to test the following hypotheses:
H1 Individuals with high ingroup-centric beliefs will experience higher levels of
cognitive dissonance than those with low ingroup-centric beliefs as a result of the
treatment.
H2 Individuals who experience dissonance as a result of the treatment will have
lower levels of humanization and empathy towards the outgroup.
H3 Individuals who are primed before the treatment will react differently to the
treatment compared to those who are primed after the treatment and those who are
not primed at all.
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Research Design

3.1

Overview

Utah provides an excellent setting to study intergroup behaviors. The vast majority
of the state’s residents are white, making them a classic ingroup. Meanwhile, increasing numbers of Hispanic immigrants in the state are a growing outgroup. Many have
noted the natural tension that comes with immigration, mostly as a result of differences in language, race, and ethnicity (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay, 2008; Gubler,
2013). Therefore, I test my hypotheses using white residents of Utah as the ingroup
and Hispanic immigrants as the outgroup.
I designed a survey instrument that was administered to just under 400 BYU students in the Political Science and Psychology departments. The instrument included
measures of ICB, empathy, dissonance, humanization, policy opinions, and one of five
treatments designed to humanize (or not humanize) Hispanic immigrants in different
ways.

3.2

Measures and Procedure

Survey respondents were invited to participate in a study about "social issues in
Utah". To begin the survey, I collected various demographic data about each individual including age (7 categories of 10 years each, from 18-24 to 75+), gender, ethnicity,
party identification (first asked if they think of themselves as a Democrat, Republican,
or Independent. Then asked if they are strong or not so strong in that party), and time
lived in Utah (less than 2 years, 2-5 years, and more than 5 years).
Next, respondents were given a measure of ingroup-centric beliefs (ICB). Subjects
were asked to rate how much they agree or disagreed with seven statements (1 =
strongly disagree, 4 = neither agree nor disagree, 7 = strongly agree). For example, respondents would see statements like “Illegal immigrants are more prone to violence
than legal residents of the state.” and “The real victims of illegal immigration are the
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legal residents of the state.” and then rate how much they agreed with each statement. I then take the average of the individualal’s responses to the seven statements.
I define a High ICB individual as one whose average answer was above or equal to
the midway point, in this case four. Respondents with an average response above
this midway point agreed with the statements more often than they disagreed with
them. Running an alpha command reveals that the statements in this measure scale
well together.
After answering the ICB questions, respondents received one of five treatments.
Treatment one acted as a control. Respondents answered the ICB questions and immediately proceeded to the dissonance, empathy, and humanization measures. In
treatment two, respondents were shown pictures of scenic waterways and asked to
rank how much they liked each picture on a scale from one to seven. They were
then given the questions designed to measure dissonance, humanization, empathy,
and policy opinions. This treatment is an alternative control treatment designed to
improve future controls. Treatments three, four and five all resemble treatment two,
except instead of rating pictures of scenic waterways, respondents were asked to rate
pictures of hispanics. In treatment three, subjects were simply shown the pictures
and asked to rate them without any context. In treatment four, subjects were told
the pictures were of illegal immigrants before rating them. In treatment five, subjects
were told the people in the pictures were illegal immigrants after they had already
rated the pictures. Again, all five treatments concluded with the subjects responding
to questions to measure dissonance, humanization, empathy, and policy attitudes.
These final three treatments will help us test the third hypothesis; that the framing of
these images will influence the magnitude of the treatment effect. A summary of the
treatments are given in the figure below.
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Immediately after receiving one of the five treatments, respondents answered a
battery of questions to measure their levels of dissonance, empathy, humanization,
and policy attitudes. The dissonance measure is incredibly important because knowing the level of dissonance experienced by each respondent helps prove my first hypothesis. The measure asks respondents to rate how much they feel various emotions
on a scale from 1 meaning "Does not apply at all" to 7 meaning "applies very much."
Emotions included Uncomfortable, Optimistic, Happy, etc. Some of these emotions
are used as distractors, while five of them (uncomfortable, uneasy, bothered, tense,
and concerned) are used to measure a respondents’ level of dissonance. This measure
has been used in many projects since 1994 (Elliot and Devine, 1994; Harmon-Jones,
2000; Harmon-Jones, Peterson, and Vaughn, 2003; Galinsky, Stone, and Cooper, 2000)
with two added items used previously by Haslam et al. (2005); Haslam (2006) and
Gubler (2013).
Empathy was measured in much the same way as dissonance, but with different
emotions. Again, respondents were asked how much each emotion described how
they are feeling right now from 1 "Does not apply at all" to 7 "Applies very much". The
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emotions included things like tenderness, compassion, and sympathy. This measure
was developed by Batson and Ahmad (2009), and since used by Gubler (N.d.). This
measure is important to my study as it allows me to test my second hypothesis, that
high ICB individuals will have lower levels of empathy towards illegal immigrants
post treatment than low ICB individuals.
Next, respondents were asked several questions designed to determine whether
or not the treatment humanized hispanic immigrants in the respondent’s eyes. Each
subject was asked to indicate the extent to which they felt that illegal immigrants
are likely to feel various emotions (1 = "Not at all", 7 = "Very likely"). Several of the
emotions presented were distractors, but two of the emotions, admiration and love,
should tell us how likely the respondent is to think hispanics are able to feel primary
human emotions. This measure also serves to make sure our treatment is dong what
we think it is; if our pictures are truly humanizing hispanic immigrants, we would
expect to see higher scores on the humanization measure from those who saw pictures
of hispanic immigrants versus those who received one of the two control treatments.
Finally, respondents answered a few questions about their policy opinions, which
I believe will measure the real-world implications of the dissonance they felt. The
instrument included eight questions about immigration policy (e.g. "Which of the
following options for immigration reform comes closest to your view?). To create the
measure I took an average of responses to all eight items and created a scale from 0
to 1 to make interpretation more simple. A higher score on this scale signifies more
support for policies that harm illegal immigrants. This measure should allow me to
see the effects of each treatment on an individual’s policy attitudes.
Table 1 presents the Cronbach’s α for each of the measures used in the survey as
well as the mean and standard deviation for each measure. Each measure scales well
together.
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Variable
ICB
Dissonance
Humanization
Empathy
Policy

Mean
3.47
2.62
4.48
4.36
3.41

Std. Dev.
1.04
1.23
1.33
1.15
0.97

Cronbach’s α
0.84
0.835
0.656
0.858
0.719

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Measures

4
4.1

Results
Hypothesis 1

My first hypothesis was that it was possible to create negative policy attitude changes
as a result of presenting positive humanizing information about an outgroup. The
results of the survey do not support this hypothesis. Table 2 shows the regression
results of the each treatment on level of support for policies that harm the outgroup.
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Table 2: Effect of Treatments on Levels of Support for Policies that Harm the Outgroup
Dependent variable:
Policy 1

Policy 2

Policy 3

Policy 4

Policy 5

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

−0.073
(0.527)

−0.792
(0.763)

−0.193
(0.939)

−0.825
(0.947)

−1.480
(0.922)

0.404
(0.858)

Hispanic

−1.080∗∗
(0.478)

0.581
(0.693)

−0.772
(0.852)

−0.114
(0.860)

−0.795
(0.836)

0.068
(0.779)

Illegal Pre

−0.791
(0.482)

0.139
(0.708)

−1.270
(0.871)

−0.741
(0.879)

−1.130
(0.856)

−0.275
(0.797)

Illegal Post

−0.297
(0.471)

0.685
(0.698)

0.309
(0.858)

0.076
(0.866)

−0.984
(0.843)

0.248
(0.785)

ICB Measure

0.290∗∗∗
(0.097)

1.220∗∗∗
(0.136)

0.738∗∗∗
(0.167)

0.874∗∗∗
(0.169)

0.663∗∗∗
(0.164)

0.806∗∗∗
(0.153)

Waterways X ICB Measure

0.014
(0.148)

0.151
(0.209)

0.055
(0.257)

0.282
(0.259)

0.359
(0.252)

−0.087
(0.235)

Hispanic X ICB Measure

0.254∗
(0.138)

−0.207
(0.196)

0.191
(0.241)

−0.007
(0.243)

0.113
(0.237)

−0.032
(0.220)

Illegal Pre X ICB Measure

0.140
(0.138)

−0.152
(0.198)

0.340
(0.244)

0.173
(0.246)

0.164
(0.239)

−0.005
(0.223)

Illegal Post X ICB Measure

0.028
(0.136)

−0.265
(0.198)

−0.122
(0.243)

−0.137
(0.245)

0.101
(0.239)

−0.263
(0.222)

1.610∗∗∗
(0.326)

−0.729
(0.473)

0.590
(0.581)

1.260∗∗
(0.587)

2.640∗∗∗
(0.571)

1.130∗∗
(0.532)

327
0.209
0.187
0.807 (df = 317)
9.320∗∗∗ (df = 9; 317)

344
0.481
0.467
1.230 (df = 334)
34.400∗∗∗ (df = 9; 334)

344
0.258
0.238
1.510 (df = 334)
12.900∗∗∗ (df = 9; 334)

344
0.306
0.288
1.530 (df = 334)
16.400∗∗∗ (df = 9; 334)

344
0.259
0.239
1.490 (df = 334)
13.000∗∗∗ (df = 9; 334)

344
0.265
0.245
1.380 (df = 334)
13.400∗∗∗ (df = 9; 334)

Waterways

Constant

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic
Note:

Policy 6

∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses
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There were no significant differences in levels of support for policies harming illegal immigrants between the control and any of the treatments. As we would expect
from previous research (Gubler, 2013), high ICB individuals are much more likely to
support policies harming the outgroup across all treatments.
One reason the treatments may not have been able to create attitudinal change
is that the treatments did not cause enough humanization compared to the control.
Potential explanations for this are discussed below.

4.2

Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis two argued that individuals with high ICBs would react differently (in
terms of empathy, humanization, and dissonance) to the humanization treatments
than individuals with low ICBs. I analyze each factor individually below.
None of the treatments in the survey had a significant effect on the level of empathy the respondent feels towards the outgroup. In fact, when controls are included in
the model, treatment five actually lowers empathy for illegal immigrants among the
high ICB group. Table 3 displays the results of an OLS Regression of the treatments
on levels of empathy towards the outgroup.
The treatments seemed to have little effect on the degree to which the respondent
thinks of illegal immigrants as "human". None of the treatments had a significant
affect on humanization, and the high and low ICB groups seem to react more or less
the same to the treatments, with the exception of treatment four. In that treatment,
the high ICB group had significantly lower levels of humanization than the low ICB
group.
As I suspected, the treatments did not create dissonance for the low ICB group.
In fact, for two treatments where respondents saw pictures of Hispanics caused decreases in levels of dissonance compared to the control. Contrary to the hypothesis,
high ICB individuals also experienced a decrease in levels of dissonance as a result
of some treatments. The treatment where we do not explicitly tell the respondent the
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Table 3: Effect of Treatments on Levels of Empathy Toward the Outgroup
Dependent variable:
Empathy
Waterways

0.566
(0.709)

Hispanic

0.974
(0.643)

Illegal Pre

0.557
(0.658)

Illegal Post

1.070
(0.648)

ICB Measure

−0.008
(0.126)

Waterways X ICB Measure

−0.129
(0.194)

Hispanic X ICB Measure

−0.189
(0.182)

Illegal Pre X ICB Measure

−0.085
(0.184)

Illegal Post X ICB Measure

−0.260
(0.184)

Constant

4.210∗∗∗
(0.439)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic
Note:

344
0.032
0.006
1.140 (df = 334)
1.230 (df = 9; 334)
∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses
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images are of illegal immigrants actually caused a drop in levels of dissonance among
the high ICB group.

Table 4: Effect of Treatments on Levels of Dissonance
Dependent variable:
Dissonance
Waterways

−0.663
(0.745)

Hispanic

−0.613
(0.676)

Illegal Pre

−0.732
(0.691)

Illegal Post

−1.720∗∗
(0.681)

ICB Measure

−0.049
(0.133)

Waterways X ICB Measure

0.088
(0.204)

Hispanic X ICB Measure

−0.054
(0.191)

Illegal Pre X ICB Measure

0.031
(0.193)

Illegal Post X ICB Measure

0.300
(0.193)
3.270∗∗∗
(0.462)

Constant

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic
Note:

344
0.066
0.041
1.200 (df = 334)
2.640∗∗∗ (df = 9; 334)
∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses

There is reason to believe that the dissonance measure is not accurately measuring
dissonance. For example, it is possible that the subjects were primed to see information about illegal immigration regardless of the treatment. Because I could not run the
survey in two waves effectively, I had to ask the ICB questions in the same survey as
the treatments. As a result, even the respondents in the control group responded to
questions about illegal immigration that could potentially cause cognitive dissonance.
This is supported by the fact that levels of dissonance were also fairly constant among
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high and low ICBs regardless of treatment. In other words, respondents in the control
group reported the same levels of dissonance as those in the treatment groups. In future experiments, it will be beneficial to ask the questions measuring ICB in a separate
survey, allowing for a true control.
Another potential reason for the lack of more significant findings related to dissonance is that our dissonance measure is self-reported. There is some evidence to
suggest that the survey’s respondents were not always truthful in their responses to
the dissonance measure. For example, there were 36 people (approximately 10 % of
respondents) that got a 0 on the dissonance scale. In other words, these individuals marked the lowest possible answer for every one of the dissonance items. Surely
some of these respondents were telling the truth, but are all of them? Unfortunately,
it is impossible to tell whether or not these responses are truthful or not. Additionally,
an analysis of photo ratings reveals that the high ICB group ranked the photos significantly lower than the low ICB group. Obviously something is happening that the
dissonance measure is not picking up. Recently, some scholars have begun measuring dissonance by looking at brain activity while respondents are in an fMRI machine
(Harmon-Jones, 2004; Jarcho, 2009; van Veen et al., 2009; Izuma et al., 2010; Kitayama
et al., 2013). The popularity of this new method of measuring dissonance highlights
the fact that the self-report measure used here is likely innaccurate. Ideally, future
projects will include the use of fMRI to measure cognitive dissonance.

4.3

Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis three argued that the framing of humanizing treatments could lead to different types of responses. To review, there were three treatments where respondents
saw pictures of Hispanics. Treatment three showed ten different pictures of Hispanics in counter-stereotypical settings (i.e. as doctors, with middle-class families, etc.),
but mentioned nothing about illegal immigrants. Treatment four was identical except
respondents were told prior to seeing the pictures that the subjects in the pictures
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were illegal immigrants. Treatment five was identical to treatment four except that
the prime came after the respondent saw all the pictures rather than before.
The framing of these treatments seems to matter under some circumstances. The
most important finding was that, as discussed above, treatment three actually caused
a decrease in levels of dissonance among the high ICB group, suggesting that it may
be possible to help high ICB individuals change their attitudes as long as we don’t
push them too hard. Another valuable finding is that trying to "pull a fast one" on
respondents is not a good idea. Treatment five had the highest scores for dissonance
and the lowest scores for empathy and humanization among both the high and low
ICB groups.

Treatment
Hispanic
Illegal Pre
Illegal Post

Mean
Dissonance
2.31
2.48
2.41

Mean
Humanization
4.46
4.68
4.51

Mean
Empathy
4.52
4.44
4.36

Table 5: Average Dissonance, Humanization, and Empathy by Treatment

This treatment acted as a sort of bait-and-switch; respondents looked at all the
pictures and then were told, almost smugly, that unbeknownst to them they had been
looking at pictures of illegal immigrants the whole time. This tactic was less effective
than more subtle methods.

5

Discussion

Although the experiment generated some good results, there is significant room for
improvement. I have discussed two major limitations to the experiment above; the
potentially biased control treatment and the inherent inaccuracies of a self-report dissonance measure. I now take time to discuss some additional problems with the design. As I mentioned briefly above, the treatments would have been more pure had
I run a pretest with the ICB measure about a week before the treatment. In addi-
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tion, that pretest should have included additional measure like the propensity for
self-justification. Gubler recently suggested that high ICB individuals can be separated into two groups; those who are likely to use self-justification to reduce dissonance and those who are likely to constructively engage it (Gubler, 2013). Without a
justification measure I was unable to separate these two groups. It is quite possible
that had I had this data, the results would be different.
Another potential issue is the strength of the treatment. The treatments used in
this experiment were mild, the respondents simply looked at nice pictures of Hispanic
immigrants and then were asked about their feelings. Perhaps a stronger treatment is
necessary to produce dissonance. This low level of dissonance also effects the other
dependent variables; if dissonance is low, we are unlikely to see large variance in
humanization, empathy, and policy attitudes between the high and low ICB groups.
Future projects will need to include stronger treatments. Some possibilities include
using a video instead of pictures, asking respondents to write short essays about the
virtues of illegal immigrants, etc.
Finally, the sample of respondents used in the survey was not representative of
the population of Utah. Because I used BYU students as the sample, there are certain
biases in the data. For example, the majority of respondents are 18-21 years old, are
disproportionately liberal, etc. As a result of these biases, especially age, the high ICB
group was small. It is likely that a representative sample with more individuals i the
high ICB group would yield different results.
Despite it’s flaws, this data has important implications for conflict resolution techniques. All respondents rated the pictures extremely high, the average score was
almost six out of seven. This would suggest that it is possible to humanize Hispanic
immigrants for the high ICB group, but that this particular treatment was not strong
enough to produce dissonance. This finding departs from the existing literature that
contends that humanization itself (causes) dissonance (Gubler, 2013) and suggests
that humanization is actually a separate phenomenon. An important topic for future
investigation will be discovering ways to take translate humanization into attitudinal
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change without producing dissonance.
In addition to new findings on humanizing treatment framing, this study also provides evidence to support previous research. Humanizing an outgroup does lead to
significant increases in empathy for that group. As Batson and others have argued,
increased empathy does seem to be a strong predictor of positive attitudinal change
Batson et al. (1997); Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000). This provides encouraging evidence that we have at least identified the correct causal chain where humanization
leads to empathy and empathy leads to attitude change.

6

Looking Towards the Future

Although the treatments in this study did not produce the intended effects, we do see
some differences in levels of dissonance and empathy between individuals with high
versus low ICBs. Because these groups react differently to humanizing treatments, it
is important that conflict resolution groups do not treat them the same.
For example, because low ICB individuals have been shown to react well to the
existing treatments, the tactics for changing their attitudes can stay the same. On the
other hand, the treatments for high ICB individuals obviously need to change. For
the high ICB group, the most effective treatment to avoid producing dissonance was
treatment three. Treatment three was the only treatment where we did not explicitly tell the respondents that the photo subjects were illegal immigrants. This may
suggest a more "light-handed" approach to humanization. Conversely, Treatment 5
decreased empathy in the high ICB group.This may suggest that surprising high ICBs
with counter-stereotypical information is not very effective. By looking at the specifics
of each treatment, we can now make more informed decisions about how future studies might continue to refine these treatments to work more effectively for Individuals
with high ICBs. In the future I hope to be involved in research that expands on these
preliminary findings by measuring levels of dissonance in an fMRI machine. By analyzing individual respondents’ brainwaves, we hope to discover more differences
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between high and low ICB individuals that will help to refine and expand on these
profiles.
The application of microtargeting to conflict resolution is still very new, and will
require significant fine-tuning to produce large changes in policy attitudes, but the
findings in this study take us one step closer to increased understanding.
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Appendix
Checking for Random Imbalance

To check for random imbalance, I used the omnibus test designed by Hansen and
Bowers (2008). According to the authors, any covariate with a standard difference
of > .2 is imbalanced. Figure 1 displays the results of the omnibus test. As the figure shows, the only covariate with significant imbalance is party identification. This
makes sense since BYU students are much more likely to identify as Republican. Inclusion of party identification in the models used above does not significantly affect
the results.

Figure 1: Omnibus Test Results
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